Prepared for "Social Movements and Organizations," University of Michigan, May 2002. We appreciate the insightful comments of Mayer Zald and Dick Scott on an earlier version of this paper.
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the spread of state laws regulating hostile takeovers in the late 1980s as instances of political mobilization and social movement activity by local corporate elites. A social movement perspective offers a parsimonious, yet comprehensive, set of mechanismspolitical opportunity, mobilizing structures, and frame alignment processes-that clarify the conditions under which mobilization will occur and succeed. We also embed the adoption of antitakeover legislation as part of an ongoing movement/countermovement between shareholder activists (who opposed state antitakeover laws) and corporate managers (who generally favored them). Event history and ordered logit analyses of the adoption of state laws show that political opportunity (local economic crisis), mobilizing structures (an existing infrastructure), and available frames (prior adoption of an antitakeover statute) played key roles in predicting a state's rate of adopting a statute, the type of statute adopted, and the strength of the legislation adopted. Implications for social movement theory are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Elite mobilizations play a key role in shaping the contours of social institutions. Prior research has demonstrated that mobilizations and the resulting struggles between competing elites shape the social structure of markets (Fligstein, 1996) , corporate governance regimes (Davis & Thompson, 1994) , and organizations (Zald & Berger, 1978; Fligstein, 1990) . More recent examples in the popular press also demonstrate the use of the tactics of popular social movements by business elites. Corporate elites in the Philippines, dissatisfied with the loss of foreign direct investment and governmental corruption, coordinated throngs of protesters and staged multiple demonstrations that led to the ouster of President Estrada (Frank, 2000) .
Demonstrations of similar magnitude (also led by the business elite) have recently taken place in Italy (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998) and South Korea. A form of elite mobilization was previewed in the United States during the late 1980s, as institutional investors sought corporate governance reform and state legislatures across the country were pressed by coalitions among business and labor to pass legislation to limit hostile takeovers of local companies (Davis & Thompson, 1994) .
In this paper, we use a social movement framework to study this process as a movement/countermovement dynamic, focusing on the spread of state anti-takeover laws among the 50 American states.
State laws regulating takeovers were highly contentious because hostile takeovers are almost always profitable for shareholders of the acquired company, and because a regime of contestable corporate control is seen as essential for the vibrancy of the American corporate sector by many scholars of law and economics. In framing takeovers in terms of a "market for corporate control," Manne (1965) argued that takeovers typically happen to badly run businesses where outsiders see a chance to buy the business from its current shareholders at a premium and then rehabilitate it. The managers of the takeover target (who were presumably responsible for its poor performance) may resist the challenge to their control, but dispersed shareholders have few other remedies for bad management. Thus, the takeover market is seen as an essential selection mechanism in a system of shareholder capitalism. Without the possibility of takeovers, the self-aggrandizing empire-builders contemplated by Berle and Means (1932) might overrun corporate America: "Protected by impenetrable takeover defenses, managers and boards are likely to behave in ways detrimental to shareholders... The end result, if the process continues unchecked, is likely to be the destruction of the corporation as we know it" (Jensen, 1988: 347) .
And yet forty state legislatures adopted laws restricting takeovers during the late 1980s, almost always at the behest of local businesses, often in coalition with local labor organizations.
The notion that corporate elites are politically influential is hardly new, as the venerable debate among pluralists, elite theorists, and Marxian structuralists shows (see Mizruchi, 1992 for a review). Less recognized is the fact that the influence of the "American corporate elite" varies according to the relevant jurisdiction (cf. Scott and Meyer, 1983 on nested levels within societal sectors). Corporate law is made at the state level, rather than the federal level. State corporate law includes the regulation of takeovers of domestic corporations (i.e., those incorporated within the state). Moreover, regardless of the locations of their operations, firms can incorporate in any state, implying that they are able to choose their corporate law regime. In this sense, law is a product of which state legislatures are producers and corporate managers (and corporate shareholders) are consumers (Romano, 1993) . Thus, changes in corporate law may be driven by consumer preferences; the relevant question is whose preferences win out, and how. We utilize the three mechanisms of the social movement perspective described by McAdam, et al. (1996) -political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and frame alignment to ascertain the conditions under which elites mobilize, the form of the mobilization, and their likelihood for success. We also address the ongoing tension between elite cohesion and pluralist theorists by theorizing elite fragmentation as part of an ongoing movement/countermovement between managers and shareholders (cf. Fligstein, 1990; Useem, 1996) .
Our empirical context (the adoption of antitakeover legislation between 1985-1990 by U.S. states) is a particularly apt case for social movement theory. This example is relevant for a number of reasons: (1) it calls into question efficiency as the driving force behind the adoption of antitakeover legislation; (2) it is ripe with political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and framing contests and an opportunity for measuring each quantitatively and testing them empirically; (3) it helps to bolster a growing segment of the social movements literature on social movements in and around (business) organizations (Scully & Creed, 2000; Zald & Berger, 1978) ; and (4) it provides a unique context for exploring movement/countermovement dynamics.
We examine state adoption of antitakeover statutes from 1985-1990 also because it represents a clear example of the political processes surrounding the ongoing struggles and settlements over who controls the corporation. In this instance, the entrenched managerial elites were challenged at the heart of their power -the conception of control of the corporation (Fligstein, 1990) . That is, the finance conception of control, which emphasized diversification and conglomeration and largely entrenched management, was called into question and ultimately replaced by the "shareholder value" conception of control (Fligstein, 1996) propagated by social movement minded institutional investors (Davis & Thompson, 1994) . However, prior to the shift in the conception of control managers partnering with unions, community leaders, and state legislatures were able to both forestall and change the form of its demise through the adoption of antitakeover statutes.
Our paper is organized as follows: first, we will offer two accounts for the adoption of antitakeover legislation -the contractarian perspective and the social movement perspective.
We also embed the adoption of antitakeover legislation in a longer historical struggle of mobilization and demobilization between managers and shareholders. Then we describe the adoption of antitakeover legislation according to political opportunity, mobilizing structures, and frame alignment processes, and derive testable hypotheses. Next, we describe our measures and data. We test our hypotheses using continuous time event history models and an ordered logit discuss. Lastly, we discuss the implications of our results for theory at the intersection of social movements and organizations.
The Contractarian Perspective on Antitakeover Legislation
The contractarian or agency approach emphasizes that corporate structures are embedded in an institutional matrix, which insures that the structures that survive are those that maximize shareholder wealth (see Davis and Useem, 2001 for a review). Relevant institutions include managerial and director labor markets, compensation systems tied to corporate performance, markets for corporate equity and debt, a community of securities analysts and institutional investors acting as corporate watchdogs, the market for corporate law, and the market for corporate control. By hypothesis, these interlocking institutions orient corporate managers toward the North Star of shareholder value. An essential insight of this approach is that corporate managers enter into this system because they are rewarded for doing so. Without the appropriate rewards this perspective assumes that managers use decision rules that are selfinterested (Subramanian, 2001) . For example, they opt into structures that vouchsafe shareholder interests (e.g., taking on uncomfortable amounts of debt, or putting stern watchdogs on the board of directors, or leaving the firm open to hostile takeover) because shareholders will pay more to own shares in firms that are accountable than in firms where it is hard to get rid of bad managers (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991) . Managers, in short, agree to be governed by a system that rewards them for maximizing shareholder value and punishes them for failing to do so. The system works because stock markets are good at placing prices on corporate shares (that is, markets are informationally "efficient"). These markets adjust to reflect the best information available about a given company at any moment, thus rendering true corporate performance intelligible. If internal control mechanisms fail (e.g., the board fails to adopt appropriate compensation policies to align the interests of management and shareholders), the share price will drop and leave the firm vulnerable to hostile takeover-assuming that such takeovers are possible. The 1982 Edgar v. MITE decision by the US Supreme Court outlawed "first generation" antitakeover statutes and thus ushered in a relatively unregulated market for takeovers. The result was an unprecedented wave of large hostile takeovers in which nearly 1/3 of the Fortune 500 faced a takeover bid (Davis and Stout, 1992) , ending only after a large number of states had adopted restrictive "second generation" takeover laws.
In order for agency theory to operate optimally in the realm of corporate law, two features are necessary, efficient capital markets and federalism. As previously noted, efficient capital markets weed out bad governance structures without the assistance of governmental regulation, by guiding voluntary adaptations by corporate managers. Federalism further reinforces efficiency by creating a market for corporate charters, which places states in competition with one another for corporate franchise revenues generated by domestic corporations. The competition prevents states from over regulating organizational form because states with onerous corporate law will lose firms to more shareholder-friendly states (Romano, 1993; Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991) . (Delaware has been particularly successful in this competition because of its enabling statute, its large body of precedents and sophisticated corporate bar, and its credible commitment to be receptive to corporate needs.) Reincorporation is also a plausible alternative because it is relatively inexpensive (approximately $70,000 in 2001) and typically qualifies as a tax-free reorganization (Subramanian, 2001) . Firms that incorporate in shareholder-hostile states (such as those with strong anti-takeover regulation) are punished with share price declines. According to the contractarian perspective, then, why would a state enact an antitakeover statute? Contractarians offer two possible explanations. First, based on a simple public choice account, states adopting antitakeover statutes might do so based on the relative presence or absence of bidders and targets in their given state. States with more targets will enact antitakeover legislation, while states with more bidders will not. Although potentially plausible, this argument can be empirically rejected because using this logic we would expect Delaware and California (two of the largest incorporators) to have a very strong antitakeover legislation. Contrary to this prediction, California has no statute and Delaware has a weak statute that was adopted relatively late and allows new firms to exempt themselves by specifying so in their corporate charters (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1991) . Second, and more plausibly, the amount of revenue (proportional or total) derived from franchise fees, should be related to enacting an antitakeover statute. That is, if a state depends heavily upon incorporation franchise fees as a source of revenue it will be less likely to jeopardize these revenues. This leads to the following proposition representing the law and economics or contractarian perspective:
H1: The greater the percentage of tax revenues derived from franchise fees; the later a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
We argue this account is incomplete because it ignores the role of collective action in shaping how the institutional "rules of the game" are set. Consequently, by understating the role of collective action the contractarian perspective also slights the historically specific nuances that trigger mobilization, the networks undergirding it, and the frames, which broaden its impact. In the next section we take an initial step to rectify these oversights by re-theorizing the adoption of antitakeover legislation as embedded in ongoing mobilization and demobilization between managerial and shareholder elites.
SHAREHOLDERS AND MANAGERS AS MOVEMENT AND COUNTERMOVEMENT

The Shareholder Rights Movement Emerges
The rise of activist shareholders and institutional investors as a viable social movement has been well documented (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Useem, 1996) . We briefly recapitulate how the shareholder activists resemble a social movement. Tarrow (1998) defines a social movement as "sustained collective challenges against powerful opponents by people united by common purpose through underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames" (p.2). The shareholder rights movement was born in the mid-1980s amid a free market-oriented Reagan administration, a sympathetic SEC, and a substantial market for corporate control enabled by the 1982 Edgar v. MITE decision-all of which created a welcoming political opportunity structure . Institutional shareholdings were becoming increasingly concentrated at the same time through public and private pension funds, and a number of formal organizations (e.g., the United Shareholders Association). Lastly, shareholder activist used resonant cultural frames, including the "shareholder value" frame and a populist characterization of corporate managers as overpaid and unaccountable plutocrats (Davis & Thompson, 1994) . The confluence of these factors resulted in an active market for corporate control, substantial proxy voting reform (the gave investors greater voice inside the corporation), and a coherent agenda.
The Emergence of a Countermovement and State-by-State Battles
By playing a considerable role in the preservation of the separation of ownership and control through collective action, we claim that managers and their related organizations (e.g., chambers of commerce, Business Roundtable, etc.) acted as a countermovement. However, in order to have a countermovement a social movement must exist. By meeting Tarrow's definition of a social movement only in response to claims made by the shareholder rights movement (Davis & Thompson, 1994) , managerial interests resemble what Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) call a countermovement. That is, a movement that only exists through being "dynamically engaged with and related to an oppositional movement" (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996 , p. 1632 ).
Thus, the shareholder rights movement, which claimed that shareholders were the one true constituency for which corporations are operated, engendered a "constituency" countermovement asserting corporations should consider shareholders in tandem with employees, customers, and communities. Zald and Useem (1987) characterize the dynamics of movement-countermovement interaction as following a "sometimes loosely coupled tango of mobilization and demobilization" (p. 247). As can be seen from the historical contestation over the separation of ownership and control in general and the regulation of mergers and acquisitions in specific, managers and shareholders have periodically faced off to renegotiate the balance of power in the public corporation. The emergence of the constituency countermovement provides an excellent example of Zald and Useem's "loosely coupled tango" because the managers and their allies only mobilize to the extent that there are acute concerns (local hostile takeover activity), an organized polity (e.g., local director interlocks, upper class clubs, high levels of unionization), and effective rhetoric (e.g., communities versus raiders, saving jobs). The absence of one or all significantly reduces the chance of the emergence of a countermovement. Next, we outline each of the interrelated components of a social movement perspective (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996) and derive testable hypotheses.
Political Opportunity
Political opportunities are the conditions that encourage, discourage, and shape the likelihood and success of mobilization. They both facilitate movement activity and constrain the range and form of possible action. Political opportunities are historically specific and change over time. They can engender action by creating grievances and incentives for action. Social movements often seek to change the political opportunity structure as occurred in the Civil Rights movement with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which opened "insider" options as well as outsider tactics (McAdam, 1982) . Similarly, the "constituency" countermovement of corporations, unions, and the public sought to enact antitakeover legislation to provide management greater latitude of action to answer hostile takeovers and other shareholder insurgencies. The shareholder rights movement also sought and succeeded in altering political opportunity by alter the law on proxy voting during the 1980s so as to transform corporate governance in way that counteracted the power of corporate managers (Davis and Thompson, 1994) .
However, as previously mentioned, political opportunity often triggers movement activity as well as results from it. McAdam (1996) synthesizes a conceptual framework of the dimensions of political opportunity that include "1. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, 2. The stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity, 3. The presence or absence of elite allies, and 4. The state's capacity and propensity for repression" (McAdam, 1996, p.27) . These dimensions can be used to analyze the failure to enact antitakeover legislation on the federal level as well as the conditions enabling action on a more local level. Antitakeover legislation on the federal level was significantly hampered by the closure of the political system as embodied in a Reagan administration that believed in a strong market for corporate control. In the event that legislation was actively considered or adopted the Reagan administration and the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) threatened to engage in repression by refusing to actively enforce the law.
Thus, the constituency countermovement was unable to surmount the absence of political opportunity that consisted of a closed political system, absence of elite allies (i.e., national politicians), and a state capable of complete repression even in the case of a technical victory.
But as Meyer and Staggenborg (1996) assert "in a federal state where there are numerous institutional sites for making policy, movements often respond to a defeat in one venue by protesting in an alternative arena" (1996, p. 1645). The managerial countermovement responded exactly in this way as they moved the conflict to the states. Managerial elites were much more successful at the state level as they could claim residence, had pre-existing social structures in place, and played a more central role in the local economy whereas as shareholder groups were widely dispersed. Protecting local industry was also a full time job of the state legislatures as the economic crises (e.g., international competition, hostile takeovers, and recession) of the 1980s wreaked havoc on local economies. The effects of raiders and hostile takeovers, both real and imagined, were also being felt on a local level. For example, in Pennsylvania, an adopter of aggressive antitakeover statutes, Gulf Oil had been taken over in the early 1980s by Chevron resulting in the closing of Gulf's Pittsburgh headquarters and the elimination of thousands of jobs. Tender offers and hostile takeovers, like Gulf Oil, are acute triggers that make potential job loss salient (especially when a local company is at risk) and can catalyze otherwise dormant or other occupied organizations and networks. In general, a hostile takeover attempt of a local company -locally headquartered and therefore having a large effect on the local economy and locally incorporated in order to be covered by an antitakeover statute led to the proposal of legislation (through the Chamber of Commerce) and adoption of legislation because it punctuated the ongoing crises of American industry. Similarly, higher unemployment and bankruptcy rates rendered states more susceptible to influence and actively seeking legislative mechanisms that would be supportive of job security without alienating business leaders. The higher these rates the more exaggerated the climate of insecurity and crisis.
Therefore, we hypothesize that factors contributing to economic crisis will create state political openness to measures perceived to reduce job loss. P 2 : The greater the political opportunity, the more likely a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
The greater the number of tender offers for firms incorporated and headquartered within a state, the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute. H 2b: The higher the bankruptcy rate within a state, the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
H 2c: The higher the unemployment rate within a state, the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute. 
Mobilizing Structures
The mobilizing structures of managerial elites have been the source of extensive attention, especially by class (e.g., Zeitlin, 1974) and social network analysts (Swedberg, 1994) .
Resource mobilization has also long been the cornerstone of social movement analysis, as grievances are necessary but not sufficient conditions to engender collective action (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) . In the constituency countermovement both formal organizations such as local
Chambers of Commerce, the Business Roundtable, and upper class clubs enabled local elites to mobilize quickly and effectively around issues that effect their interests. A representative quote from Romano (1992) illustrates how coupling political opportunity with pre-existing organizational capacity led to swift and successful action describes the process as follows: "State takeover laws are typically sponsored by a local chamber of commerce at the behest of a local corporation that has become the target of a hostile bid. They are often enacted rapidly, sometimes over a few days in a special emergency session" (p. 52). The swift enactment of state antitakeover legislation in the vast majority of states reflects the depth and effectiveness of these networks. These more established organizations also gave rise to new organizations temporarily formed to advance the cause of antitakeover legislation. To represent the role of formal organizations in the adoption of takeover statutes we hypothesize:
The better developed the mobilizing structures the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
The greater the number of upper class clubs in a state, the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
The interlock network has a long history in studying the diffusion of innovations (e.g., Davis, 1991) and as a mechanism for creating cohesion and aggregating interests into collective action (see Mizruchi, 1996 for a review). Interlocks increase cohesion by bringing individuals into closer contact with one another. When the networks are locally concentrated (connected firms headquartered and incorporated in the same state) they become a potentially powerful force in effectuating institutional change. Relatedly, the interlock network also plays a powerful role as a source of information transmission and social influence. Interlocks with firms that have adopted an innovation generally lead to subsequent adoption by the interlocking firm because they become more familiar with the benefits of adoption and because social influence and social comparison processes will inspire them to adopt to "keep up with the Joneses." Thus, when local elites are connected to firms incorporated and headquartered in a state that has previously adopted an antitakeover statute both processes of increased information transfer and social influence will lead the local elites to mobilize for antitakeover legislation. We add two additional specifications: 1) the firms from the prior adopter must be fully local (headquartered and incorporated) because these are the firms that were most likely to be involved in adopting a statute and the firms covered by the statute and 2) the prior adopters must be recent prior adopters.
The greater the number of interlocks between firms incorporated and headquartered in a state, the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
H 3c : The greater the number of interlocks between firms incorporated and headquartered in a state and firms incorporated and headquartered in the state of a recent adopter, the sooner a state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
Another key component of quickly enacting antitakeover legislation was strong support by union members. Wayne (1990) , reporting on Pennsylvania's statute at the time of adoption, stated "Pennsylvania business groups supporting the bill are aligned with union seeking to protect … their members and local politicians worried about the impact of corporate takeovers on communities" (D1 col. 3). The partnership between managerial elites and labor unions extended to a large portion of the statutes adopted. This partnering of labor, management, and community generated credibility and urgency for adopting statutes. Thus, we hypothesize the following:
The greater the union density within a state, the sooner the state will adopt an antitakeover statute.
Frame Alignment Processes
Both resource mobilization and political process approaches to the study of social movements and collective action have been critiqued for their inattention to linking the social psychological and the structural (Snow, et al., 1986) . Frame alignment refers to shared schemata of interpretation regarding values, beliefs, and goals that facilitates collective action and help bridge the micro to macro linkage (Snow, et al., 1986) . Framing consists of three componentsdiagnostic, prognostic, and motivational (Snow & Benford, 1988) . The struggle between the shareholder rights movement and the constituency countermovement pitted two frames in direct opposition. The shareholder rights movement utilized frames that articulated free markets, economic efficiency, and corporate democracy to attract supporters. It diagnosed the problem as entrenched empire-building managements that ignored the concerns of shareholders. The solution to the problem was an active market for corporate control. The rationale for action was the moral inducement to maintain the free market and the promise of increased wealth. The movement also utilized expert testimonials to assist in inducing support (e.g., renowned scholars from the contractarian perspective). However, these frames failed to resonate with the public as high language regarding economic efficiency lacked relevance to the "life world" or experiential commensurability for participants and bystanders (i.e., the general public). The movement also lacked empirical credibility, as it is tough to test the claim that the economy is becoming more efficient (Snow & Benford, 1988) . Pension fund investor Greta Marshall amplifies the point: "It's very easy to take a picture of someone out of work because of a takeover, it's very hard, though, to take a picture showing the U.S. economy as a whole becoming more competitive due to takeovers."
The constituency countermovement did not have any of the same troubles as it articulated specific threats to the local economy, hostile takeovers, as the problem. The main thrust of framing efforts across the states was the protection of local jobs and local companies from foreign raiders desiring to break up a company and slash jobs for short-term gains. Romano also suggests that the frames utilized by the countermovement possessed greater salience for the average constituent because "a news story on a takeover resulting in unemployed workers will … be vividly remembered and considered evidence of the negative effects of acquisitions" (1993, p. 82) . In other words, by design, the frames employed by the constituency countermovement resonated because they were empirically credible (i.e., job loss easy to observe) and experientially commensurable (i.e., the loss of jobs and/or destruction of community institutions has great impact on the "life world"). To the extent that there were culturally and politically available repertoires to act upon, states could more effectively parlay effective rhetoric into legislation. A key determinant of the availability of an antitakeover repertoire is having adopted a first generation antitakeover statute.
H 4 : States adopting a first generation antitakeover statute, will adopt a second generation antitakeover statute sooner.
METHODS
Sample. We collected time-series data on the adoption of antitakeover statutes between 1985
and 1990 for all 50 states. We chose this time frame because it is analytically meaningful for the phenomenon under study. The starting date of 1985 is after the 1982 Edgar v. MITE decision that initiates the large wave of acquisitions and hostile takeovers. The 1985 start date is also significant because it pre-dates the ratification of the Indiana antitakeover statute that ushered in the "second generation" antitakeover statutes (the CTS case). The end date is also theoretically significant because by 1991 (i.e., the end of 1990) 40 of the states had adopted some form of antitakeover legislation and acquisitions had reduced to a trickle (17 between 1991 and 1996 with only 5 classified as hostile) (Davis & Robbins, 2000) . Data on the timing and form of antitakeover statute adoption comes from the Investor Responsibility Research Center.
Statistical method. We model the rate of adopting an antitakeover statute using event history
analysis. The particular method we employ is the Cox proportional hazards model with time varying covariates. We utilize the Cox model because it does not specify the exact form or distribution of event times and it is "in the judgment of many, it is unequivocally the best allaround method for estimating regression models with continuous-time date" (Allison, 1984, p. 35 Moreover, given that there is only a small sample of states (n=50), we are required to use a methodological technique that compensates for the "information deficit" problem. Following
Mintz and Palmer (2000), we utilize a four-step procedure to maximize comprehensive testing of all relevant variables while minimizing the demands on our small sample size in our final models. The procedure is as follows: 1) enter theoretically related variables (e.g., political opportunity), 2) enter all the significant variables from step one into a "provisional multi-factor model", 3) enter all the significant variables from step two and re-enter (individually) each variable dropped after step one into a "second-stage multi-factor model," and 4) the significant variables from step two and step three are entered into a "final" model. The results reported in Tables 3 and 4 include the "final" model only.
Dependent Variable. Given that we had exact dates for when a particular statute was adopted we measured the time from the Edgar v. MITE decision (which rendered first generation statutes obsolete) until adoption (or censoring at the end of 1990) as our dependent variable. To measure statutory strength we created an index (from 0-6) that is the sum of the number of statutes adopted as part of the initial adoption. The general idea being that a greater number of related statutes entails more comprehensive protection from takeover activity. The statutes included in our analysis include the following: "control share statutes" which require a vote of "disinterested" shares before an offer can be consummated, "fair price statutes" which prevent an acquiring firm from effectuating a two-tiered acquisition, "other constituency" or "directors' duties" provisions, which require consideration of other (non-shareholding) constituencies in the tender offer process, "poison pill endorsements" which allow companies to adopt the poison pill antitakeover defense (Davis, 1991) , "freeze out" provisions that institute a waiting period for subsequent business combinations of , most commonly, two, three, or five years, and "disgorgement" or "recapture of profits" provisions that mandate the redistribution of proceeds of a hostile bid.
Independent Variables
Political Opportunity. We operationalize four measures that we believe capture a state's potential susceptibility to elite mobilization -the number of tender offers for firms incorporated and headquartered in a state, the bankruptcy and unemployment rates, and the legitimation of second generation statutes in the CTS v. Dynamics Corporation case. All variables were collected for each year under study (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . These measures give a sense of openness of the polity to movement activity and as well as the stability of political alignments. The number of tender offers approximates the dislocation that could be attributed to hostile takeovers (or merger and acquisition activity). Takeover attempts also proxy the salience of takeovers and their potentially untoward consequences to the public, unions, and the legislature. The tender offers data was collected from Compact Disclosure and includes every tender offer between 1985-1990 (inclusive Mobilizing structures. Our mobilizing structures variables try to capture the strength and scope of influence of local managerial elite and labor unions because we assert that greater numbers and greater cohesion will yield greater influence and ability to affect public policy outcomes.
We measured labor union influence as union density or the proportion of the state's workforce that belongs to a labor union. Union density was measured at 1983, 1986, and 1987 . Data was drawn from the Bureau of National Affairs' Union Membership and Earnings Data Book.
Managerial elite influence was measured using the number of interlocks between firms both incorporated and headquartered in the same state. The firms need to be incorporated in the same state because firms are governed by the laws of their state of incorporation. The additional condition of sharing headquarters state minimizes the impact of the outlier Delaware and reflects the fact that interlocks are only likely to generate local political action to the extent that both the business and polity at large stand to suffer from a hostile takeover. Firms headquartered and incorporated in a state are likely to have longer standing ties with the community and consequently these firms are likely to wield more influence. We measured board of director interlocks for 1986. Prior analyses of the interlock network have demonstrated that it is quite stable over time and that a point in time measure should be representative of the whole period under study. We also measured interlocks with firms headquartered and incorporated in a state that has previously adopted a statute. Many studies of board of director interlocks have indicated they are a source of information and facilitate the adoption of new practices (see Mizruchi, 1996 for a review). As such, ties to recent prior adopters (states that have adopted in the past year) should introduce antitakeover statutes as a viable method for fending off hostile bidders. Lastly, formal organizations also played a key role in aggregating local elite interests.
We measured one type of formal organization -upper class clubs and social registries. The data were coded as the sum of all clubs and registries in a state and collected from Domhoff (1998) .
Frame Alignment
First Generation Statute. Thirty-seven states adopted antitakeover statutes that were struck down by the Edgar v. MITE decision in 1982. These prior adopters should be likely to construct a new statute as state level legislation is an available and previously viable repertoire for managerial elites irrespective of a broader coalition. It also fulfills the diagnostic and prognostic components of framing as having a first generation statute highlights the problem -takeovers as well as a solution -more systematic legislative protection from takeovers.
The Contractarian Perspective
Franchise Fees/Tax Revenue. Prior empirical work on antitakeover statutes in law and economics has asserted that greater dependence on franchise revenue results in adopting shareholder friendly laws (as boards of directors and shareholders vote on reincoporation) or managerially friendly laws. We use a lagged time-varying covariate to measure the proportion of tax revenues derived from franchise fees. This approach has also been used in prior work that is representative of the efficiency-based perspective (Romano, 1993) . The data was collected from the Bureau of the Census, State Government Tax Collections.
Control Variables
We accounted for multiple alternative explanations for our hypothesized effects through four control variables. These four variables fit broadly under the rubric of state capacity. State capacity implies that states that are more "innovative," larger, and better organized are more likely to adopt any type of legislation irrespective of the other factors in play. We control for state innovativeness using the Walker innovation index, which accounts for a state's proclivity to adopt novel legislation (Walker, 1969) . The Walker innovation index is measured as reported in his seminal 1969 article. 1 State size is accounted for by a variable measuring the number of nonfarm firms in a state. We use this variable as a control to ensure that our measures of mobilizing structures are not merely a proxy for the size of the business community. The data was collected from the Bureau of the Census and is updated annually in our study. In all the analyses the variable is logged to correct for skewness. The number of registered lobbying organizations is another potential explanation for why a state might adopt an antitakeover statute more quickly. That is, the greater the lobbying infrastructure the more readily the network can be tapped to enact legislation. This variable is using data from Gray and Lowery (1996) for the number of registered lobbying organizations in 1990. 1990 is used because the data are incomplete prior to that date. Although the number of organizations grows dramatically over time, the relative rankings of states remain largely the same between 1980 and 1990. Lastly, given the inability of the Business Roundtable to effectively lobby for federal legislation regulating takeovers in light of the strong free market stance of the Republican Reagan administration, Republican state legislatures may adopt later or not at all. We control for party composition of the state houses using two dummy variables for the state House and the state Senate (1=Republican, 0 otherwise). The data was collected from the U.S. Statistical Abstract and updated every election cycle. Table 1 summarizes the variables included in the analyses and their hypothesized effects. Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all the variables used in our statistical analyses. Many of the variables are significantly correlated with each other (as would be expected with time series data) and some highly correlated with each other. However, regression diagnostics, the variance inflation factor, yielded results (no values greater than 3) that make multicollinearity less of a concern.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The results of the event history analysis are displayed in Table 3 . We hypothesized that acute economic crises -high bankruptcy rates, high unemployment, and a large number of tender offers for local companies that all threaten local business and jobs should result in a greater likelihood to adopt antitakeover legislation and a stronger package of laws (hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c) . None of these hypotheses received any support in our full models. However, in the single factor models (not reported) both the bankruptcy rate and unemployment rate received statistically significant support. While the number of tender offers for local companies did not contribute to the rate of adoption of antitakeover statutes or the strength of the statutes adopted, qualitative analysis of individual state histories indicates that tender offers for local companies, especially large corporations classified as "good corporate citizens," often triggered the process for adopting a statute. For example, several specific takeover battles spurred the adoption of antitakeover provisions Burlington Industries in North Carolina, Greyhound in Arizona, DaytonHudson's in Minnesota, Aetna in Connecticut, and Gillette in Massachusetts. Thus, we still argue that political opportunities created by discrete events that disrupt the extant power structure strongly shaped the pattern of adoption. Our hypothesis (2d) that the Supreme Court's ruling in CTS v. Dynamics Corporation would increase the rate of adoption received considerable support in both models. This indicates that the legitimation of a statute by the Supreme Court both shapes and enables subsequent mobilizations (Burstein, 1991; McAdam, 1983) . It enables the subsequent mobilization, as many of the later adopters were triggered by the CTS decision. The court decision also emboldened action as it played a significant role in the number of statutes adopted.
Our variables representing mobilizing structures received strong support. The number of local board of director interlocks significantly increased the speed of adoption. For each additional local tie the rate of adoption increases 282% and doubling the mean number of local ties from 3.5 to 7 increases the rate of adoption an astronomical 1,451% 2 . Thus hypothesis 3b
receives strong support. Similarly we find that upper class clubs (hypothesis 3a) and union density (hypothesis 3d) also significantly speed the adoption of antitakeover statutes. These findings indicate the formal organizational capacity and labor's participation significantly aided in the adoption of antitakeover legislation. That is, the rhetoric of saving jobs and preserving the local community may have been critical in swaying legislators (i.e., an effective frame), but the actual participation of labor leaders in articulating the frame and mobilizing their membership was also critical. Our variable for frame alignment also received statistically significant support.
Adopting a first generation statute created an available repertoire that later legislatures could effectively capitalize upon (hypothesis 4). Lastly, the contractarian perspective received no support (hypothesis 1). Franchise fees were unrelated with the speed of adoption. This lack of statistical support highlights the importance of collective action in the adoption of corporate law and the inability of the contractarian perspective to account for collective action either theoretically or empirically. Table 4 displays the results of the ordered logit analysis of statutory strength. The pattern of results is mostly consistent with the findings of our event history analysis. Once again the number of local interlocks played a key role in the number of laws adopted. However, in this model, ties to recent adopters increased the number of laws adopted. For each additional tie to a recent prior adopter, the likelihood of multiple statutes increases 7%. This may be indicative of a social comparison process whereby the later adopter attempts to "one up" the early adopter and take a more aggressive stance on takeovers. Also, the political opportunity created by Supreme
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Court's ruling in the CTS case as well as the available repertoires of first generation statutes also significantly contributed to the likelihood of adopting multiple statutes.
CONCLUSION
Our results indicate that elite mobilization can be usefully studied using a social movement framework. Differences in the political opportunity structure (more bankruptcies and takeovers) made state legislatures more prone to adopt antitakeover legislation early on, and states' dependence on franchise revenues influenced their corporate law agendas. This much might have been expected from a standard public choice account. But what distinguishes a social movement account is its attention to frames and social structures. Movement activity over time bears relatively modest relation to "objective" variation in grievances (Tilly, 1978) . The world is full of potential grievances, and events taken to be normal in one period are intolerable in other periods. It is when changes in incentives (e.g., from the political opportunity structure)
are collectively interpreted as a cause of action by a well-organized set of actors that significant movements arise. Thus, the better-organized the local corporate elite was (as indicated by the degree of overlap in corporate boards, presence of upper class clubs), the more likely the state legislature was to adopt management-friendly legislation regulating hostile takeovers. The interlock network also led to stronger and more comprehensive statutes being adopted. Labor played a key role in framing the struggle as raiders versus communities and denoting takeovers as prologues to widespread layoffs. Labor also directly participated in creating the legislation as unions mobilized to encourage states to adopt statutes more quickly.
Given the relatively rapid and widespread diffusion of antitakeover legislation, why didn't the labor/management/community partnership continue? Romano (1992: 52) notes that, "a close examination of the political process of takeover legislation raises serious questions whether employee welfare is a concern interest he first place. Business lobbying groups that are the moving force behind takeover statutes uniformly and vigorously oppose plant-closing legislation, and takeover statutes regulating severance pay and union contract security are careful to exempt friendly acquisitions. If employees' job security, not just management's, was the real object of concern, we would not observe such carefully crafted distinctions." That is, the coalition coalesced around a very narrow and specific issue -the hostile takeover and not a new approach to the corporation. With the drastic decline of takeover activity in the 1990s (Davis & Robbins, 2001) , coupled with a growing shareholder rights movement, and a recovering economy weakened the urgency of the countermovement and its coalitions dissolved. In addition, with antitakeover legislation as the solution the constituency countermovement was not able to extend the frame to other settings (Snow & Benford, 1992) .
We note two things in closing. First, although we have advocated a social movement perspective on elite mobilization, our argument has clear affinities with neoinstitutionalist perspectives. Networks are a critical mechanism for the spread of norms and practices among organizations in institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) , and it is a small step from here to political mobilization (e.g., Mizruchi, 1992) . Moreover, while our approach highlights the fragmentation of corporate law in a federated system, Scott and Meyer (1983) noted long ago the importance of specifying the appropriate jurisdiction for process of institutionalization. As other papers on this panel indicate, neoinstitutionalism and the study of social movements stand to benefit from closer integration. Second, as our opening paragraph indicates, the use of the rhetoric and tactics of grass-roots social movements, like the more general rhetoric of populism, rebellion and revolution, have proven to be readily adopted by business for its own purposes (cf. Frank, 2001 ). We await with interest the business response to the anti-globalization movement. 24.66*** + Significant at p < 0.1 * Significant at p < 0.05 ** Significant at p < 0.01 *** Significant at p < 0.001
